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A generalization of the Nash demand game is examined. Agents make
simultaneous offers in each period as to how a pie is to be divided.
Incompatible offers send the game to the next period, while compatible
offers end the game with a split-the-dif ference trade. The set of
perfect equilibria of this game includes any individually rational
outcome, including inefficient outcomes and even including the outcome
of perpetual disagreement. We suggest a stronger equilibrium concept
of universal perfection, which requires robustness against every
rather than just one sequence of perturbed games. The set of uni-
versally perfect equilibria also includes all individually rational
outcomes. The results provide useful insights into both simultaneous-
offers bargaining and the nature of the perfect equilibrium and
similar concepts (such as stability and hyperstability) in infinite
games.

PERFECT EQUILIBRIA IN SIMULTANEOUS-OFFERS BARGAINING
I. Introduction
Suppose two agents have the opportunity to divide a "pie" if they
can agree on the terms of the division. If the agents make simulta-
neous demands for shares of the pie, receiving their demands if they
are jointly feasible and receiving nothing otherwise, then any divi-
sion of the pie which is efficient (wastes none of the pie) is a Nash
and subgame perfect equilibrium outcome (cf. Nash (1953), Selten
(1975)). If the agents alternate in making proposals as to how the
pie is to be divided, with an acceptance at any point implementing the
accepted proposal and a rejection sending the game to the next pro-
posal, then the set of Nash equilibria still includes all individually
rational, efficient outcomes but a unique subgame perfect equilibrium
appears (Rubinstein (1982)).
Nash responded to the multiplicity of equilibria in the one-shot
simultaneous-offers or "Nash demand" game by examining the equilibria
of slightly perturbed games, with particular importance attached to
the limit of these equilibria as the perturbations become arbitrarily
small (Nash (1953); see also Binmore (1981)). A similar technique
forms the basis of the perfect equilibrium concept of Selten (1975).
Nash found that the perturbed-game argument allowed a unique equilib-
rium to be identified in the Nash demand game: the Nash bargaining
solution.
This paper examines the perfect equilibria of a generalization of
the Nash demand game. Incompatible demands lead to a subsequent pair
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of simultaneous demands (with a discounted pie), with this process
potentially continuing for an infinite number of stages. The
analysis provides useful insights into simultaneous-offers bargaining
as well as into the concept of a perfect equilibrium.
We find that the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes in this
repeated simultaneous-offers game consists of every possible indi-
vidually rational outcome. This includes inefficient outcomes and
even includes the outcome of perpetual disagreement. Given the pre-
sence of simultaneous offers, it is not completely surprising that
multiple equilibria arise. It _is_ somewhat surprising that every
possible outcome including delay and perpetual disagreement (even with
discount factors that may be significantly different from unity) can
be supported by a perfect equilibrium.
To achieve these results, we exploit the ability to verify the
perfection of an equilibrium by constructing a single, arbitrary
sequence of perturbed games with equilibria which converge to the
equilibrium in question. Our perturbed games exhibit some initially
counterintuitive features, and one suspects that if counterintuitive
perturbations were precluded, then the set of equilibrium outcomes may
be substantially smaller. This suspicion is reinforced by the ability
of Nash to use a perturbed game argument to identify a unique equi-
librium. We investigate this possibility in Section IV by defining an
equilibrium to be universally perfect if every converging sequence of
perturbed games features a sequence of equilibria approaching the
2
equilibrium in question. We find that the set of universally perfect
equilibrium outcomes again includes all possible outcomes including
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perpetual disagreement. Thus, no restrictions on the set of equi-
librium outcomes can be achieved by confining attention to a limited
set of (presumably appealing) perturbations.
These results allow us to shed some light on the issues involved
in extending the concept of a perfect equilibrium to an infinite game.
These are discussed in Section VI. First, we observe that important
differences arise if payoffs rather than strategies are trembled in
the perturbed games. The distinction between small mistakes and mis-
takes made with small probability is also important. X<Je then find
that the hyperstability concept of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) has
infinite-game properties which differ in important ways from the
finite-game case. Next, previous studies have devoted attention to
how one defines a completely mixed strategy in an infinite game. We
find that our results are unaffected by the formulation chosen. How-
ever, the presence of infinite strategy sets does require some atten-
tion be given to the generally ignored issue of what one means by
convergence. We conclude that the perfect equilibrium concept is
readily applied to our infinite game but that such application in
general is not routine.
The following section presents the model. Section III character-
izes the set of perfect equilibria. Section IV examines universally
perfect equilibria. Section V discusses perfect equilibria in
infinite games. Section VI concludes.
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II. The Model
Two agents, 1 and 2, must bargain over the division of a pie of
size one. In stage i, i = 1, 2, ..., the agents simultaneously choose
offers x.. and x
? ,
where an offer is a designation of how much of the
pie agent 1 is to receive. If x. = x~ = x, then an agreement is
reached in which agent one receives x of the pie and agent two
receives 1-x. This terminates the bargaining. If x > x , each agent
is demanding more of the pie than the other offers, and a disagreement
occurs which sends the game to the next round of offers. If x < x
,
each agent is offering more of the pie to the opponent than the oppo-
nent demands. We assume in this case that an agreement occurs (and
bargaining terminates) at the split-the-dif ference offer of x =
(x +x )/2 with agent 1 receiving x and agent 2 receiving 1-x. We let
T denote this game.
If agreement is reached in period t on offer x, an outcome we
denote (x,t), the agents' payoffs are U (x,t) = xD (agent 1) and
U~(x,t) = (l-x)D (agent 2), where D and D are discount factors
satisfying D. e (0,1), i = 1,2. If no agreement is reached, payoffs
are zero to each agent. We let (z,°°) denote this outcome.
Rubinstein (1982) examines a model in which agents make offers
alternately instead of simultaneously, with agent 1 (2) making a
proposal as to how the pie should be split in odd (even) periods and
agent 2 (1) accepting or rejecting this proposal. He finds:
1. A Nash equilibrium with outcome (x,l) exists for any x e [0,1]
2. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists and gives outcome
((l-D^/U-D^), 1).
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3. If D = D = D, chen the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
outcome approaches (1/2,1) as D approaches 1.
The first statement reveals that any division of the pie in the first
period (i.e., any individually rational, efficient outcome) can be
supported as a Nash equilibrium. The second statement reveals that
strengthening the equilibrium requirement to subgame perfection yields
a unique equilibrium, with an agreement in the first period that gives
agent 1 a payoff of (1-D )/(l-D D ). Statement 3 indicates that as a
common discount factor approaches unity, which can be interpreted as a
reduction in the length of time between successive offers, the first-
mover advantage dissipates and the pie is split evenly.
III. Perfect Equilibria
We now demonstrate that in the simultaneous-offers model, even the
perfect equilibrium concept is insufficient to discriminate among
equilibria. We begin by rigorously specifying strategies, payoffs,
and the equilibrium concept. Let ¥ be the set of possible histories
of play in periods 1 through t-1, and let i}> e ¥ be a particular
history. A period t (behavior) strategy for agent i is a set of
probability measures g (• |<f ) which specifies a probability space
([0,1], E, g. ( # |*J> )) for each possible history ty e ¥ , where S is
the o-algebra of Borel subsets of [0,1]. This identifies the (pos-
sibly mixed) strategy chosen by agent i to determine the period t
offer. A strategy for agent i is a set of probability measures of
this type for each period t = 1, 2, ... . A strategy will be denoted
g . Strategies will be said to be pure if each g. ( • | ip ) concentrates
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its mass on a single offer and will be said to be history-independent
if for each t, g. (•pji ) is identical for all ty e Y . Strategies
°it ' t t t °
g and g yield a measure F((x,t)|g ,g ) on the space of outcomes
[0,1] x Z , and expected payoffs are then given by
I [0,l]xZ+U - (x,t)dF((x,t) |g ,g 2 ). Strategies (g ,g 2 ) are an equilibrium
of game T
G
if g
l
satisfies g = argmax / U^(x,t )dF((x,t) |g ,g
2
>
§1 '
and g satisfies a similar condition.
Next, we define a perturbed game and use this concept to formulate
the perfect equilibrium notion. Let ([0,1], E, h ( # |^ )) be a measure
space with the property that h. ([0,1] U ) < 1 and u(S) > => h. (SU )it t it t
> for any S e Z, where u is Lebesgue measure. Let h. be a specifica-
tion of one such measure for agent i for each history in each period.
Then a perturbed game V is constructed from the game T by adding the
H G
restriction that the agents choose strategies such that for all i, t
and \\> , g (S|i|> ) > h. C S | ip ) V S e Z. Notice that strategies in the
perturbed games must be "completely mixed" (since g. (S|iJ; ) _> h. (S\ty )
and h. (S\ty ) > if u(S) > 0). This is consistent with the finite-
3
game formulation of a perfect equilibrium. A perturbed game will be
said to be history-independent if for each t, h. (
• | ^ ) is identical for
all i^ e T . Strategies (g.,g ) are a perfect equilibrium of game T
t t 12 (j
if there exists a sequence of equilibria (g,,g 9 ) (n=l,2,...) of per-
turbed games T such that lira g. (*|t ) = g. (*|^ ) for all i, t, and ij> ,
n-*-°°
where the limit refers to the weak convergence of probability measures (cf
Billingsley (1968)).
We now demonstrate that any individually rational outcome of game
4
V can be supported by a pure strategy perfect equilibrium:
G
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Theorem 1 . Let (x,t) e {[0,l]xZ
+
} U {(z,°°)}. Then there exists a
pure strategy perfect equilibrium yielding (x,t) as an outcome.
Proof . The proof proceeds in six steps.
[Step 1]. We first construct the candidate strategies for a per-
fect equilibrium. We will work only with history-independent strategies
and perturbed games, and will simplify g. (• Up ) and h ( • 1 1|; ) to g.°
°it t it t it
and h or g (•) and h. (•). Fix (x,t) with x e (0,1) (Step 6 con-
siders cases of x = or x = 1). To set notation, recall that in a
pure strategy, each g must concentrate its mass on a single offer.
If g concentrates its mass on offer y, then g (S) = 1 for any set S
it it
containing y (i.e., the probability is unity that the period t offer
comes from the set S if S contains y) and g. (S) = if S does not
contain y. In light of this, consider the following pure strategies:
r
«1T
(8)
T < t <
g 2T
(S) -
1 if 1 e S
otherwise
1 if e S
otherwise
¥ S e Z
V S e Z
T>t g^CS) V S e Z, i = 1,2.
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Notice that player 1 demands all of the pie (makes an offer of 1)
until period t. Thereafter, player 1 offers x. Player 2 similarly
demands all of the pie (makes an offer of 0) until period t, and
thereafter offers x. These offers accordingly yield the outcome
(x,t).
[Step 2]. Next, we construct the perturbed games r„ which will be
used to show that (g. ,g ) is a perfect equilibrium of T . Let the
1 z o
measures h. for n > 2 and n e Z be given by (recall that u is
it + b '
Lebesgue measure):
h" (S)
It
t < t <
- <
Vs>4
(s)
h" (S)
2t
= <
2 n
n
(S)
if e S
V S e Z
otherwise
if 1 e S
V S e Z
otherwise
x > t h" (S) =
IT
(S) ¥ S e Z, i = 1,2.
-9-
Notice Chat after period t has been reached, the measure by which an
agent is constrained in each period can be pictured as a uniform den-
2
sity on the unit interval with height 1/n . Before period t, this is
supplemented by the requirement that agent 1 (2) place a mass of
probability 1/n on the offer of zero (one). Figure one illustrates
these constraints.
[Step 3]. We now identify a candidate equilibrium for the per-
turbed game. Consider the following strategies:
T < t <
'It
(S) = {
h^CS) + 1
h" (S)
It
- 1/n - 1/n'
g
n
2T
(s) = <
h" (S) + 1
2t
h, (S)
2t
- 1/n - 1/n'
if US
otherwise
if e S
otherwise
T > t g
"
lT
(s) -
h" (S) + 1
it
h
iT
(S)
- 1/n if x e S
otherwise.
These reveal that in periods T < t, agent 1 satisfies the constraint
and then allocates all remaining probability mass to the offer of one.
Agent 2 satisfies the constraint and allocates all remaining probabil-
ity mass to the offer of zero. After period t has been reached, each
_ [> Mass poin*: for
agent 1
Mass point for
agent 2
Period T < t
Period I > t
Figure 1. Perturbed Gase Strategy Constraints
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agent satisfies the constraint and places any remaining probability
mass on the offer x.
[Step A]. We now show that these strategies are an equilibrium in
the perturbed game. Let agent 2's strategy be given by g , and con-
sider agent l's best reply. Consider period t < t. Let g be fixed
arbitrarily for t * t, and consider the effect of possible period t
offers on agent one's payoff. Possible period T offers and the corre-
sponding payoffs are:
Offer Payoff
o v + A/fdx.^Lv +n
-^
+ i r "o
y e (0,1) V + n|~ (D,V / dx + / ^ dx +-^- + (1 - - - ^)D,V— 2 1 ' 2 n 2 n2l
In y n
I
11 "
/
.|i+ (1-XV
where _V is that portion of the expected payoff resulting from possible
agreement in periods preceding x
, n is the probability that the game
reaches period T without an agreement (given the constraints h. , we
have n e (0,1)), and D. V is the expected payoff from continuing in the
game beyond period T given that no agreement is reached in period t.
Notice that _V and V e [0,1]. We immediately see that 9 > 9 for any
V and V £ [0,1]. Differentiating 9 shows that 9 is increasing in y~
y y
for any _V and V e [0,1] (given our presumption that 1/n < 1/2), so
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that 8 is maximized by setting y=l. This reveals that for any spe-
cification of g for t $ t, agent l's optimal action in period t is
to allocate as much probability as is allowed by the constraints to a
mass point at an offer of unity. This argument can be applied to any
period t < t, establishing the optimality of g for any t < t. A
similar argument establishes that for any x ^> t, agent l's optimal
action is to allocate as much probability as possible to a mass point
at an offer of x. This demonstrates that g, is a best response to& lt r
g . Given the symmetry of the problem, (g ,g ) is then an equil-
ibrium of r„.
[Step 5]. It remains to show that the g. converge weakly to g. .
From the Portmanteau theorem (Billingsley (1963, pp. 11-12)), it is
sufficient to show that lim f f.dg. = j f.dg. for any continuous1 1 IT 1 IT
c n->-°°
function f: [0,1] * R. This follows immediately from noting that as
1 1
L
n grows, |/f
i
dg"
T
- / f1
d«lx I
is given by |— f
±
(0) +— ] f^z) -
n
(l/n+l/n 2 )f.(l)| if t < t and |~ f f.(z) - (l/n 2 )f.(x)| if t > t,
n
each of which in turn approaches zero as n gets large. (The case of
agent 2 is analogous.)
[Step 6]. Finally, we consider cases of (x,t) for which x = or
x = 1. Fix t. Intuitively, a sequence of equilibria of perturbed
games can be constructed which approaches an equilibrium of game
r featuring outcome (l/n,t) (or (l-l/n,t)) for any n e Z . This abil-
VJ +
ity can be exploited to construct a "diagonal sequence" of equilibria
of the perturbed games which approaches an equilibrium V giving out-
come (0,t) (or (l,t)). The latter two equilibria then also appear as
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perfect equilibrium outcomes. More formally, let (g , g~ ) be the
strategies given in step 1 with x replaced by zero, so that g. dupli-
cates g. for x < t and for t _> t is given by
1 if e S
x > t g! (S) = {
— IT n
otherwise.
Let r„ be the perturbed game constructed in step 2 and let (g , g_ )H 1 Z
be strategies which duplicate the (g , g„) of step 3 for x < t and
which for T
_> t are given by
h" (S) + 1 - 1/n
2
if 1/n e S
X > t g (S) = {
— it
.
n ,„
.
,
h. (S) otherwise.
IX
•n »n*
.
The analysis of step 4 with x replaced by 1/n shows that (g 1 , g_ ) is
an equilibrium of r„« The arguments of step 5 then can be used to
H
show that g. converges weakly to g. , with |/f.dg - Jf.dg given11 2
by |-f.(0) + —x J f.(z) - (1/n + 1/n )f.(l)| for x < t and given
1
l 11
by h-s- / f.(z) + (1 n-)f.(-) - f. (0)1 for x > t, each of which ap-
n n
proaches zero as n gets large (given that f. is continuous). This
establishes that (g. , g 9 ) , giving outcome (0,t), is a perfect equi-
librium. A similar argument gives a perfect equilibrium with outcome
(l,t).
II
The intuition behind the inefficiency in this result is straight-
forward. The equilibrium calls for each player to demand all of the
pie until period t, hence delaying agreement until t. This behavior
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is supported by the realization that given such behavior from one's
opponent, one might as well demand the entire pie (until period t),
since the opponent's insistence on demanding all of the pie ensures
that no gains exist from making any other offer. The result is then
a Nash equilibrium, though it is not immediately obvious that this
behavior can be supported in a perfect equilibrium. In particular,
the perturbed-game strategy constraints ensure that one's opponent
does not demand the entire pie with probability one in period x < t.
Some gains then do exist from making an offer which does not demand
all of the pie, and it is accordingly no longer obvious that demanding
the entire pie is optimal. However, a key feature of the strategy
perturbations we have constructed is that each agent is constrained to
attach a probability of 1/n to an offer which concedes all of the pie.
This constraint attaches enough probability mass to the opponent's
offer which concedes the entire pie that the optimal response is to
exploit the possible concession by attaching as much probability as
possible to an offer demanding the entire pie.
It is important to note that the discount factor plays no role in
our analysis. In particular, the following is obvious:
Corollary 1 . The set of perfect equilibrium outcomes is
{[0,l]xZ
+
} u{(z,«)| for all D , D
2
e (0,1).
Hence, any outcome remains a perfect equilibrium outcome even with
arbitrarily short time periods (values of D and D which approach 1)
and even for discount factors significantly different from 1.
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IV. Robustness of Perfect Equilibria
The previous section exploited the fact that an equilibrium is
perfect if it is the limit of the equilibria of a single, arbitrarily
chosen sequence of perturbed games. The perturbations examined attach
probability masses to offers which concede the entire pie. One must
question whether this is reasonable, given the apparent foolishness of
such an offer (though the offer is not dominated), and may even ques-
tion whether perturbations involving mass points are in keeping with
the spirit of Selten's finite-game formulation of perfection.
The observation has been made in the context of finite games that
perfection may allow too much latitude in constructing perturbations,
and that unintuitive results may be given by perturbations which allo-
cate relatively large probabilities to unreasonable actions. The re-
sponse has been to formulate equilibrium concepts which restrict
attention to perturbations with an economic or intuitive justifica-
tion. Examples include the proper equilibrium concept (Myerson
(1978)), which stipulates that more costly deviations from a proposed
equilibrium strategy should receive less weight in a perturbation; and
the uniformly perfect equilibrium concept (Harsanyi (1982)), which
stipulates that a perturbation should give all strategies equal like-
lihood (see Simon (1987) for a similar approach). We would like to
pursue this approach without becoming embroiled in questions as to
what constitutes a reasonable perturbed game. To do this, we examine
an equilibrium with the property that for every converging sequence of
perturbed games there exists a sequence of equilibria converging to
the equilibrium in question. We refer to such an equilibrium as a
-15-
universally perfect equilibrium. Clearly, such an equilibrium cannot
be criticized for being supported by peculiar perturbations.
Let ([0,1]), E, h
e
.
(• |i|> )) be a measure space with h. ([0,l]|i|» ) =
e and u(S) >0=>h^ (Sjip) >0 for any S e E. Let hf be a collection
of such measures, one for each t e Z
+
and ty e ¥ . An e-perturbed
game, denoted T , is obtained from T by adding the constraint that
H G
agents choose strategies such that for some h.
, g. (Sltj; ) >
h. (S|ij; ) V S e £ for all t and ty . An equilibrium (g..,g ? ) of game
r is a universally perfect equilibrium if, for any sequence of
G
e-perturbed games with lira e =0, there exists a sequence (g ,g„) of
n+°°
equilibria of these games such that each g. (
•
|
ty ) converges weakly to
i ltHV
We now show that any individually rational outcome can be sup-
ported as an outcome of a pure strategy universally perfect equil-
ibrium.
Theorem 2 . Let (x,t) e {[0,1], xZ } U {(z,~)}. Then there exists a
pure strategy, universally perfect equilibrium giving outcome (x,t).
Proof . The proof proceeds in seven steps.
[Step 1]. The first five steps demonstrate that pure strategy
universally perfect equilibria exist giving outcomes (x,t) for any x e
(0,1) and t-1. Fix (x,t) e (0,l)x{l}|. We then identify a history-
independent candidate for a universally perfect equilibrium:
-16-
1 if x e S
g. (S) = < VS e E, c £ Z , i = 1,2.
otherwise
These pure strategies obviously give outcome (x,t).
[Step 2]. We now identify a useful property of equilibria in per-
turbed games. Consider an e-perturbed game r„. There exists a number
c
k(e,x) with lim k(e ,x) = such that there exists an equilibrium r„
e+0
characterized by an offer in each period within distance V2k(e,x) of x
upon which each agent places a probability mass of 1-e. (The remaining
e probability is determined by the constraint on strategies in game
r u ). In particular,
2e(2-(l-e) (D x-D
2
+0
2
x))
k(e,x) = 2 * (D
(l-e)-2e(l-e) (D^Dj)
The existence of k(e,x) ensures that there exists an equilibrium of
the e-perturbed game r u which is "close" to (g.,g ) in the sense that
in each period, each agent allocates at least 1-e probability to an
offer within V2k( £ >>0 of x. Because lira k(e,x) = 0, these equilibria
e+0
must converge to (g. »g-j), ensuring that the latter is universally per-
fect.
[Step 3]. This step provides the calculations which yield k(e,x).
We simplify the analysis by demonstrating the existence of k(e,x) for
the more general case of arbitrary rather than completely mixed stra-
tegy perturbations (i.e., we allow but do not require u(S) > =>
ti
. C S 1 1|/ ) > to hold). Consider period t-1. Let agent 2 attach a
mass of probability 1-e to offer y. We will say that agent 1 "matches"
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this offer if agent 1 also attaches a mass of probability 1-e to offer
y. We investigate the conditions under which matching y is optimal
for agent 1.
It is immediately apparent that agent 1 will not match offer y if
y < D V (where V is the period t expected payoff to agent i of
continuing in the game from period t onward if period t-1 ends in dis-
agreement), since the payoff from matching y falls short of the payoff
from disagreeing and proceeding to period t. If y > D V , it may or
may not be optimal for agent 1 to match y, depending upon how the e
probability contained in agent 2's strategy constraint is allocated.
For example, if agent 2's strategy constraint places a mass of proba-
bility on an offer z only slightly less than y, agent 1 may find it
optimal to allocate probability to z rather than matching offer y
(thereby reducing the risk of disagreement though also slightly
reducing the payoffs from some agreements). This can occur only if z
is sufficiently close to y, since otherwise the probability which
agent 2's constraint must attach to the mass point at z would have to
exceed e. The number k(e,x) indicates how close z must be.
Let k e [0,1] be such that no matter how the e probability in
agent 2's strategy constraint is allocated, the total Lebesgue measure
of the intervals of offers in the set {y: y > D.V } on which agent 1
does not find it optimal to match agent 2's offer is less than k . We
calculate a value for k .
Notice first that if e is sufficiently small, then agent 1 will
not find it optimal to attach probability to any offer greater than y.
Doing so causes agent l's payoff to drop from y to D V (< y) with
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probability 1-e and to increase at most from D V to 1 with probabil-
ity at most e, and this tradeoff is disadvantageous for sufficiently
small e. However, agent 1 may find it optimal to attach probability
to an offer less than y if some of the e probability determined by
agent 2's constraint is allocated to offers just below y.
Suppose that agent 1 is to find it optimal to place some proba-
bility on making offer z < y such that z > D V rather than matching
y. We would like to investigate the smallest probability that agent
2's constraint must attach to offers in the interval [z,y) in order to
induce agent 1 to allocate probability to offer z rather than match y.
(Notice that if agent 1 allocates probability to offer z rather than
matching offer y, then agent 1 will also automatically be deterred
from matching any offer from (z,y]). This smallest probability,
denoted p(z), can be achieved by attaching a mass of probability p(z)
to the offer z which is just sufficient to induce agent 1 to make
offer z rather than y (and hence rather than any offer from (z,y])
while attaching the constraint's remaining e-p(z) probability to an
offer below z. The probability p(z) must satisfy
(l-e)y + eD
1
V
u
= (1-e)
-^ + p(z)z + (e-pCz^D^. (2)
The value of p(z) which solves this equality identifies the least pro-
bability which must be expended in order to prevent agent 1 from
matching any offer from the interval (z,y] given that agent 1 is
induced to make offer z rather than match agent 2's offer. Is this
the least-probability method of preventing agent 1 from matching
-19-
offers in the interval (z,y]? To find out, we differentiate (2) to
get
H tI &) (!) . v M£l. (3)
I dz 1 It dz
and
dz
— 2 2
Since z-D V > 0, we have dp(z)/dz < and dp (z)/dz > 0. The first
result is expected, and reveals that a larger probability must be ex-
pended if agent 1 is to be deterred from matching offers in a larger
interval. The second result indicates that the probability which must
be expended increases at an increasing rate as the length of the
interval [z,y) increases. This in turn reveals that agent 1 could be
deterred from matching offers on the interval (z,y] with less of agent
2's constraint-determined e probability being expended if instead of
relying upon a single probability mass at offer z, we place one mass
at offer z'e(z,y) and another mass of offer z. The mass at offer z'
will induce agent 1 to attach probability to offer z' rather than
matching offers from the interval (z',y] and the mass at offer z will
induce agent 1 to attach probability to offer z rather than matching
offers from (z,z']« It is then clear that even more mass points would
be still better. In the limit, this approach can at best allow us
to deter agent 1 from matching offers from the interval (z,y] while
expending probability (as z decreases) at the rate which prevails if
z = y (and p(z) = 0), or at rate
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dp(z)
dz
1-e
2(y-DlVit )
(5)
We now seek, a lower bound on the absolute value of dp(z)/dz given
p(z) = (i.e., we seek the slowest rate at which probability must be
expended). This is achieved by setting y at its maximum value of
unity and D V at its minimum. If the strategies from period 2
onward each feature a mass point of probability 1-e on some offer
within V2k(e,x) of x, we have
Vlt > D1 ( x- 1/2k(e,x))(l-e) , (6)
and hence
dp(z)
dz
1-e
2(l-D
i
(x-l/2k(e,x))(l-er)
(7)
This gives the slowest rate at which agent 2's probability must be
expended as the total length of the intervals of offers which agent 1
will not match increases. We have a total of e probability to use for
this purpose. In light of this, the largest interval of offers which
agent 1 will not optimally match has a maximum measure k which solves
dp(z)
dz
= e. (8)
Hence,
k
L
<
2e(l-D
1
(x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e) )
Pe (9)
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We calculate similarly that the set of offers which agent 2 will not
optimally match has a measure k~ which satisfies
2e(l-D (l-x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e) 2 )
k
2
<
—
. (10)
Then let k be the sum of the upper bounds on k and k , or
2e(2-D
1
(x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e) 2 -D
2
(l-x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e) 2 )
k(e,x) = —
(ID
2e(2-(l-e) (D^-D^D^)
)
(l-e)-e(l-e) 2 (D
i
+D
2
)
This matches (1). Notice that lim k(e,x) = and that our choice of
e+0
period was arbitrary. The interpretation of k(e,x) is then that for
each period teZ , for any interval of offers of length k(e,x) or
longer contained within the set {y: ye[D V ,1-D V ]} and for
any perturbed game r„, there must be at least one offer within this
interval with the property that if agent 1 (2) places a mass of proba-
bility 1-e on the offer then agent 2's (l's) best reply is to also
place a probability mass of 1-e on that offer. Notice that k(e,x) has
2
been calculated under the assumption that V > (x-l/2k( e,x) ) (1-e)
and V > (l-x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e) .
[Step 4]. We now construct an equilibrium of perturbed game T
possessing the promised properties. We begin by constructing a trun-
e e
cated perturbed game, denoted T , which is obtained from game T by
Hn H
imposing the requirement that from period n onward, each agent place
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a probability mass of 1-e on offer x. We specify an equilibrium of
game V as follows. First, observe that given the period n actions,
"n
— 2 — 2
we have V. > (x-l/2k(e ,x) )(l-e ) and V, > (l-x-l/2k(e,x) )(l-e) . For
In Zn
sufficiently small e, we also have an interval of length k(e,x) cen-
tered around x and completely contained within {y: ye[D V » 1_D 2V 2 ^"
We can accordingly find an offer y _ in period n-1 which is within
*/2k(e,x) of x upon which both agents will find it optimal to place a
probability of mass 1-e. We can generalize this finding by noting
that for sufficiently small e: (1) if both agents place a mass of
probability 1-e on an offer y within distance l/2k(e,x) of x in period
t, then V > (x-l/2k(e,x))(l-e)
2
and "v^ > (l-x-l/2k(e,x) ) (1-e)
2
; (2)
there will be an interval [x~V2k(e,x), x+V2k(e,x)] c
{y: ye[D V , 1-D V ]}; and (3) we can accordingly find an offer
y within distance V2k(e,x) of x such that both agents will optimally
devote a probability mass of 1-e to the offer. These three obser-
vations allow us to proceed by induction from period n backwards to
period 1, constructing a sequence of offers {y } such that
|y -x| < l/2k(e,x) for all t=l, ..., n and such that it is an equil-
ibrium of T„ for each agent to allocate probability 1-e to offer yHn t
in period t. By letting y =x for t > n, we extend {y } to the
oo oo oo
sequence {y.K , e [0,1] . Let Y e [0,1] denote this extended
t t-l n
sequence.
We next let n, the identity of the period in the truncated per-
turbed game after which strategies are arbitrarily fixed, approach
oo oo
infinity. This yields a sequence {Y } .of elements of [0,1] . Then n n = l
oo
Tychonoff theorem ensures that the space [0,1] is compact in the
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product topology formed when each [0,1] is endowed with the standard
topology. Hence, some subsequence of (Y } (also denoted {Y } for con-
n n
00
venience) converges to an element Y e [0,1] in the product topology.
Notice that each Y induces a strategy (g (n),g (n)) of the untruncated
n i L
perturbed game r„, and that Y also defines a strategy (gf",g|) of game
T • It is now easy to verify that since {Y } converges to Y in the
H n
CO
product topology on [0,1] , then the sequence of strategies
(g.(n),g (n)) converges to (g ,g_) in the m-topology defined by
Fudenberg and Levine (1986, Definition 7.2). Our sequence of trun-
cated perturbed games r u and their equilibria (g,(n),g (n)) along% 12
with the untruncated perturbed game r u and its candidate equilibrium
rl
£ £
(g, >g ) then satisfy the conditions of Proposition 7.1 of Fudenberg
£ £ £
and Levine, which ensures that (g, ,g ) is an equilibrium of T .
[Step 5]. We now collect results. We have demonstrated that for
£ £ £
any £-perturbed game T , we can find an equilibrium (g ,g ) with the
H 12
property that in each period both agents allocate a mass of probability
l-£ to an offer within V2k(£,x) of offer x. In addition, lim k(£,x) = 0.
£ £>0
For any sequence of £ -perturbed games T with lim £ = 0, we then
n H n
have a sequence of equilibria that converges to the equilibrium
(g.,g_) defined in Step 1. This ensures that the latter is a univer-
sally perfect equilibrium of game T .
G
[Step 6]. We next extend this result to outcomes (x,t) with
x £ (0,1) and t > 1. We require strategies which are not history-
independent to do so. Fix (x,t) £ {(0,l)xZ }. Define g. to be a
probability measure on [0,1] which attaches unitary (zero) probability to
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any set containing (not containing) the offer y. Let the candidate
equilibrium strategies g. be given by
IT
r
g lT
(s|t
T
)
fl if 1 E S
otherwise
T < t I
g 2T
cs|*
t
) -
l_
1 if e S
otherwise
V S e Z
V S e Z
r
g
x (S)5 ix v
T > t glT
(S|*
T
) = {
1+x
g
2
(s)
if i|/_ is such that either both or
neither agents have played strategy
g^ T for all t < t.
g (S) if iJ>T is such that only agent 1 played
strategy g^ T for all x < t.
if ^ T is such that only agent 2 played
strategy gi T for all x < t.
Intuitively, these strategies promise agents an agreement on offer x
in period t as long as they play strategies which ensure disagreement
until period t. If either agent unilaterally deviates from the pre-
scribed strategies in the first t-1 periods, then the period t payoff
secured by that agent is halved.
Given the analysis of Steps 1-5, establishing universal perfection
requires that we show that for any e-perturbed game, agent 1 (the case
of agent 2 is analogous) will find it optimal to allocate as much
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probability as allowed by the constraint to an offer of 1 in some
period t' < t, given that agent 1 (2) allocates as much probability as
possible to an action given by g in periods T t t' (in all periods).
The optimality of doing so follows immediately from noting that a
deviation from such an action in period x' reduces agent l's payoff by
an amount which approximates D x/2 arbitrarily closely as e be-
comes small (with this decrease caused by the change in actions from
period t onward induced by agent l's deviation); and possibly in-
creases agent l's payoff by an amount which approaches zero as e beco-
mes small (with this increase resulting from the enhanced probability
of a period x' agreement). We thus have perturbed-game strategies
which approach g. . The latter then constitute a universally perfect
equilibrium, and we have a universally perfect equilibrium yielding
outcome (x,t) for any (x,t) e {(0,l)xZ }.
[Step 7]. We can next use arguments analogous to those presented
in Step 6 of the proof of Theorem 1 to relax the restriction of x e
(0,1) to x e [0,1], expanding the set of universally perfect equil-
ibrium outcomes to {[0,l]xZ }. A similar argument involving a
sequence of equilibria yielding outcomes (y, n) for any n e Z allows
us to include the outcome (z,°°) (perpetual disagreement), completing
the proof.
II
Universal perfection thus also allows any individually rational out-
come to be supported by an equilibrium. It is again clear that dis-
count factors play no role in this result:
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Corollary 2. The set of universally perfect equilibrium outcomes is
{[0,l]xZ
+ }
U [(z,»)) for all D^ D
2
e (0,1)-
The universally perfect equilibria presented above which yield
delayed agreement are composed of strategies which are not history-
independent. If strategies are constrained to be history-independent,
then the set of outcomes which can be realized by universally perfect
equilibria shrinks to the set [0,l]x{l}, or the set of all individually
rational, efficient outcomes. Universal perfection thus provides
some power in reducing the set of equilibria if and only if one is
willing to limit attention to history-independent strategies.
V. Perfect Equilibria Concepts
The results of the previous section allow us to consider some more
general issues involved in the concept of a perfect equilibrium. We
are especially interested in the insights that can be gained from
having characterized the set of perfect equilibria of an infinite
game. This both provides a different perspective from the simple,
finite games in which perfection is usually studied and raises new
issues concerning how one defines a perfect equilibrium in an infinite
game.
The basis of the perfect equilibrium formulation is the concept of
a perturbed game and we begin with the question of how the perturba-
tions are defined. We initially confine our attention to a one-period
version of our game in order to contrast our results with those of
Binmore (1981, Section 3), who examines (among other models) a one-
period version of a game very similar to that considered here.
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Binmore specifies strategy perturbations by adding an error terra to
each player's chosen offer. He then derives a function p(x,y) which
gives the probability of an agreement in the perturbed game given that
offers x and y are chosen. If p(x,y) is "not pathological" (the
primary requirement is a smoothness property), then a converging se-
quence of equilibria of games with successively smaller perturbations
must approach the Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950)) of the
original game. This provides a powerful uniqueness result. However,
the distributions of the error terms attached to agents' offers must
not contain mass points if p(x,y) is to be smooth. As a result,
agents make mistakes with unitary probability, though these mistakes
may be extremely small. This suggests a fundamentally different con-
cept of a strategy tremble. It is intriguing to find that in an
infinite game trembles with small probability and arbitrarily small
trembles with high probability give quite different results.
Binmore also examines perturbed games which are achieved by
directly assuming that there exists a function p(x,y) such that, for
given offers (x,y), an agreement is reached with probability p(x,y)
and a disagreement with probability l-p(x,y) (rather than deriving
this function from assumptions on strategies). The function p(x,y) is
then required to approach the corresponding function of the unperturbed
game. It is again shown that if p(x,y) satisfies certain conditions,
most notably a smoothness condition, then this technique singles out a
unique equilibrium of the game: the Nash bargaining solution. If no
conditions are placed on the function p(x,y), then any equilibrium of
the original game can be achieved. Hence, a unique equilibrium can be
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achieved (at least in the one-period game) if one is willing to allow
payoffs to be perturbed directly rather than insisting on strategy
perturbations and then is willing to select a particular type of per-
turbation. This contrasts with our Theorem 2 and suggests further
investigation of how equilibria based on direct payoff perturbations
differ from those based on strategy perturbations.
For example, what happens if we allow direct payoff perturbations
and then seek the natural counterpart of the universally perfect equi-
librium examined above, i.e., an equilibrium which can be achieved as
the limit of any converging sequence of payoff-perturbed games? In a
one-period model, this would yield a hyperstable equilibrium (Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986)). However, the ability to choose arbitrary payoff
perturbations can easily be exploited to show that no single equi-
librium is hyperstable, and that the smallest hyperstable set in the
one period game (i.e. , the smallest set of equilibria such that every
converging sequence of payoff-perturbed games has a sequence of
equilibria approaching some equilibrium in the set) includes all
possible outcomes. To verify this, fix x and let payoffs in per-
turbed game n be given by
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Player 1
Payoff
Player 2
Payoff
L-x
Offers
X >
^
X
l
" X2 "
X
x
l
+ X
2
X
l
+ X
2 1
—
-2— +
n
1 -
1 -
X
l
+ X
2
x
l
+ x
2
/ < s lx < x
L
< x
2
,
x
L
> x
2
-
-
^1
X > X„ > X , X < x + —
2 12 In/I
x < x < x , x < x -
—
1 2 1—2 n
X
l
+ X
2
x
l
+ x
2 1 1
(1 ^
>
+
n
X > X2 >
X
l'
X
2 ^
X
l
+
n
One readily verifies that the only equilibrium of this game calls for
both players to attach a probability mass of unity to offer x .
Letting n approach infinity, we have a sequence of payoff-perturbed
games whose perturbations are becoming arbitrarily small and whose
equilibria approach an equilibrium with outcome (x ,1). This argument
can be repeated for any x
,
so that no single equilibrium can be
hyperstable, and a hyperstable set in the one-period game must include
outcome (x ,1) for any x e [0,1]. Payoff perturbations may thus
allow some power to select equilibria if one is willing to restrict
attention to a particular class of perturbations, but one cannot find
equilibria which are robust to all perturbations.
The results of the previous paragraph may be somewhat surprising
in light of the observation that in the one-period game, an equil-
ibrium in which both agents allocate a probability of unity to some
offer x e (0,1) is strict (i.e., is comprised of unique best
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responses). In finite games, strict Nash equilibria are hyperstable
(constitute singleton hyperstable sets), while we have just seen
that this need not hold in an infinite game. It is straightforward
to illuminate the source of this difference. In a finite game, the
payoff received by player i at a strict Nash equilibrium exceeds the
payoff attached to any of i's alternative strategies, and the finite-
ness of the set of alternatives ensures that there exists some e. >
such that the equilibrium payoff exceeds the payoff of all alternative
strategies by at least e.. One then need only restrict payoff per-
turbations to be smaller than min {e./2} to ensure that the equi-
i
librium in the original game is also an equilibrium in any perturbed
game yielding hyperstability. In an infinite game, such an e. may not
exist. The infiniteness of the strategy sets allows an equilibrium to
be strict but also for there to exist alternative strategies for
player i which give payoffs arbitrarily close to the payoffs of the
equilibrium strategies. There will then be no limit on payoff per-
turbations small enough to ensure that in any perturbed game the
payoff from the equilibrium strategy exceeds that of all alternative
strategies. A strict equilibrium thus need not be hyperstable. This
is precisely the situation encountered in the previous paragraph.
We now return to the infinite-period game. In a one-period game,
a universally perfect equilibrium based on payoff perturbations is a
hyperstable equilibrium in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)
(actually, a singleton hyperstable set) and a universally perfect
equilibrium based on strategy perturbations is a stable equilibrium.
In the repeated game, the coincidence between universally perfect
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(with strategy perturbations) and stable equilibria breaks down. In
particular, the notion of stability is based on perturbations in
normal form strategies, while our formulation is based on perturba-
tions of the behavior strategies of the extensive form. Intuitively,
our trembles are uncorrelated across information sets, while the
former are not. Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept have
traditionally employed extensive-form trembles, though Kohlberg and
Mertens argue forcefully for the use of normal-form trembles. We
choose extensive-form trembles because equilibria based on such
trembles preserve the property of subgame perfection, unlike concepts
based on normal-form trembles.
In order to construct extensive-form strategy perturbations while
retaining the spirit of Selten's perfect equilibrium, we must specify
what is meant by a completely mixed behavior strategy. In our game,
the fact that a behavior strategy set is the unit interval and that
Lebesgue measure appears to be the natural tool for examining the unit
interval allows us to describe a strategy as completely mixed if it
attaches zero probability to "no set of positive Lebesgue measures.
In general, strategy sets may not admit such a natural measure (and
one might even question how "natural" Lebesgue measure is in this
case). Simon (1987) provides an alternative formulation which essen-
tially requires strategy perturbations to attach positive measure to
any open subset of the strategy space. Our requirement implies this,
since nonempty open subsets of [0,1] must have positive Lebesgue
measure.
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An alternative approach would be to first approximate the infinite
game with a finite game. For example, one might take the behavior
strategy sets in our game to be offers at the form
x./2
,
x e {0,1,... 2 }. One could calculate a conventional perfect
equilibrium in this finite game and then define the limit of such
equilibria as the approximation becomes finer (e.g., as n grows) to
be a perfect equilibrium in the infinite game. Bagnoli and Lipman
(1987) adopt this approach in an analysis of schemes for implementing
the provision of public goods while Hellwig and Leininger (1986) de-
velop this approach somewhat more generally and explore some potential
difficulties. In particular, it is not immediately obvious that in
extensive form games a sequence of equilibria of approximating games
converges or that it converges to a perfect equilibrium of the
infinite game, though Hellwig and Leininger offer some positive
results for games of coaplete information. Bagnoli and Lipman (1987)
observe that the choice to formulate the notion of perfection via
discrete approximations appears to have substantive implications in
their analysis.
Fortunately, our analysis is unaffected by these types of consider-
ations. Whereas our definition of a perfect and universally perfect
equilibrium includes the Lebesgue-measure-based requirement that
perturbed-game strategies be completely nixed, the proof of Proposition
2 requires no conditions on perturbations. Our result concerning uni-
versal perfection thus holds regardless of how one formulates the per-
fect equilibrium notion.
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The infiniteness of our strategy sets does raise other issues.
We have exploited the topology of weak, convergence to discuss conver-
gence of the probability measures which describe the behavior strate-
gies at each history of the game. Perhaps employing a stronger
topology (i.e., one with more open sets) will make the requirements
for convergence sufficiently more stringent as to yield a smaller set
of perfect or universally perfect.
An obvious stronger topology to place on probability measures is
to exploit the notion of uniform convergence in order to raetrize the
set of probability measures on ([0,1], £, •) by letting
d(g,g') = sup(|g(S) - g'(S)|). (12)
SeE
The resulting topology is at least as fine as the norm topology on the
space of measures on ([0,1], Z, •) (Samuelson (1986, Appendix 2)),
which is in turn well known to be at least as fine as the weak* top-
ology (equivalently , the topology of weak convergence). One readily
verifies that with this topology, the set of equilibria in Theorems 1
and 2 no longer include equilibrium outcomes of the form (0,t) or
(l,t). The basic force behind this result is the fact that in the
topology of uniform convergence, a sequence of probability measures of
the form
,1 if 1/n e S
g (s)
otherwise
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does not: converge to
II if e S
g (S) =
lO otherwise.
We choose the topology of weak convergence because it is not only the
most commonly employed topology in similar circumstances but is also
extremely intuitive. In particular, it is common to say that the
sequence of probability measures g converges to g and the topology
of weak convergence is required to preserve this intuition. Notice
also that the topology of uniform convergence gives somewhat counter-
intuitive sets of perfect and universally perfect equilibria. For
example, the set of possible period 1 equilibrium outcomes is no
longer closed in the standard topology on [0,1] and the set of perfect
equilibria admits indefinite delay while precluding an immediate
agreement which allocates all of the gains from trade to one agent.
Notice finally that a similar issue arises in choosing a topology
on the infinite products of spaces of measures which comprise a
strategy. We have imposed the product topology. One obvious alterna-
tive is to strengthen this to the box topology, in which case our
arguments establishing perpetual disagreement as a universally perfect
equilibrium outcome do not hold, though other results are unaffected.
For reasons similar to those of the previous paragraph, we impose the
product topology.
V. Conclusion
We have examined the perfect equilibria of a generalization of the
Nash demand game. The analysis differs from many conventional studies
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in calculating explicit perfect equilibria of a relatively complicated
game. The results provide sorae insight into both the nature of simul-
taneous offers bargaining and the issues which arise in extending the
perfect equilibrium concept to infinite games.
We find that the bargaining game exhibits multiple perfect equil-
ibria and multiple "universally perfect" equilibria. This is not
surprising given the presence of simultaneous offers, but it is some-
what surprising that the multiplicity includes every possible outcome,
including inefficient outcomes and even including perpetual disagree-
ment. Simultaneous offers games are often considered to be norma-
tively appealing because of the symmetric treatment of the two players.
Our results reveal that this symmetry is purchased at the high price
of a multitude of equilibria, many with quite undesirable properties.
It is common practice to apply the perfect equilibrium concept to
infinite games with either no consideration given to how the definition
must be modified or with attention devoted only to the issue of how a
completely mixed strategy is defined. We find that our results do not
depend upon the formulation of completely mixed, but that other con-
siderations are important. These include whether it is payoffs or
strategies that are perturbed and what topology one uses to define
convergence. It is clear that sorae care must be taken when working
with infinite games.
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FOOTNOTES
We also presume that if the demands total less than the entire
pie, then the players split the underaanded portion of the pie. This
departure from the formulation of Nash is inconsequential. The impor-
tant feature for our results is that if two demands do not exhaust the
pie, then the agents' payoff are increasing in their demands.
2
It is with considerable reluctance that we introduce a new term,
and it is our intention here only to conduct a robustness analysis and
not to offer a new equilibrium concept.
3
This requirement, that the constraint assign positive probability
to any set of positive Lebesgue measure or equivalently that Lebesgue
measure be absolutely continuous with respect to the perturbation
measure, appears to be the weakest infinite-set counterpart of the
finite-set requirement that strategies be completely mixed. One might
suggest alternative, stronger requirements on constraints. For
example, one might want to exclude mass points in constructing per-
turbed games. Section IV demonstrates that the results hold for all
possible specifications of perturbed games, ensuring that our results
are robust to any specification of perfection.
4
We restrict attention to pure strategy equilibria because it is
obvious that if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, it will entail
some risk of a delayed agreement. The cause of disagreement in such a
case involves the inability to coordinate mixed-strategy outcomes and
instances of games which allow this type of coordination failure are
common. It is much more surprising if agents play pure strategies
which yield a unitary probability of delay, since disagreement then
cannot be attributed to coordination failures.
The topology of weak convergence is the weak* topology that
the set of measures on ([0,1], E, •) inherits as the dual of the space
C[0,1] (continuous functions on [0,1]). Any open set containing the
measure g^ t then contains an open basic subset of the form
N- = {g:|/f.dg - /f d£ | < 6, 1-1, ..., y)
git
where y e Z+ , 6 > and f^ e C[0,1]. To show convergence, we must
arbitrarily fix y, 6 and fj and show that there exists N e Z+ such
that g, e N~ for all i, t, and n > N. For details, see Billingsley
°it §it b j
(1968, especially p. 16 and Chapter 1), Dunford and Schwartz (1967)
and Parthasarathy (1967, pp. 32-51).
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Other refinements which rely upon payoff perturbations include
the regular equilibrium (Jansen (1981); called a quasi-strong equil-
ibrium by van Damme (1983)), the essential equilibrium (Wen-Tsiin and
Jin-He (1962), van Damme (1983)), and the strongly stable equilibrium
(Kojiraa, Ckada, and Shindoh (1985)). A refinement which appears to
crucially exploit the finiteness of strategy sets and hence does not
readily extend to infinite choice sets is van Damme ' s regular equil-
ibrium (van Damme (1983)). Binmore and Herrero (1985) examine a
security equilibrium, which is more general than a sequential equil-
ibrium. Bernheira (1984) and Pearce (1984) examine extensive form
equilibrium concepts based on the notion of rationalizability which
are ineffective in this case. Finally, a persistent equilibrium
(Kalai and Samet (1984)) does not exist in our game. In particular,
the infiniteness of the pure strategy spaces causes minimal retracts
to fail to exist.
It is readily apparent that a pure strategy, history-independent
universally perfect equilibrium cannot yield an outcome (x,t) with t > 1.
e
Suppose that it can. Consider a sequence of perturbed games Tu in
e
n
which h. , is given by
e 1/n if x e S
h." ,(S) = { ¥S e Z, 1-1,2,it-1 I
, ,
a
1/n otherwise
where a is an integer. An analysis similar to that of Step 4 of
Proposition 1 (in which history-independence was assumed) reveals that
if a is sufficiently large, then the optimal period t-1 actions must
be for both agents to either attach a mass of probability l-l/na to offer
x or to possibly attach such a mass to some other common offer. The
equilibria in this sequence of perturbed games must then approach out-
come (y,t-l) for some y rather than (x,t), precluding the possibility
that the latter is a pure strategy universally perfect equilibrium
outcome.
H
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